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Abstract 
The urgency of the issue is related to changes in the Ukrainian banks’ business en-
vironment, taking into account the impact of domestic and global financial instabil-
ity and the implementation of the regulatory framework for banking regulation of 
the National Bank of Ukraine in accordance with the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision recommendations. The main goal of this research is to analyze the de-
gree of implementation and compliance with the Basel III regulations in Ukrainian 
banking system. To carry out the research, regulatory and legislative documents of the 
National Bank of Ukraine, the Basel Accords, statistic data of the Ukrainian banks and 
the National Bank of Ukraine were used. For this purpose, the analysis of main indi-
cators of Ukrainian banks’ financial stability within the period of 2014–2017 is made. 
Thus, post-crisis regulatory changes have aimed at restoring bank stability. The results 
seem to suggest that bank regulatory changes may be repressive, for instance, cleaning 
and optimization of the banking system as an effective tool for anticrisis management. 
As a result, it was concluded that banks with foreign capital are the most stable in the 
banking system of Ukraine in comparison with domestic banks.
Andriy Ramskyi (Ukraine), Valeria Loiko (Ukraine), Olena Sobolieva-
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INTRODUCTION 
Integration of Ukraine into the European banking sphere involves the 
introduction of common standards in the field of banking regulation. 
In the European Union, the recommendations of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, known as “Basel II” and “Basel III”, apply 
for the mutual integration of the banking systems of the EU member 
states and beyond.
Thus, under current conditions, the need to adapt Ukrainian banking 
legislation to the regulatory requirements of the European Union, on 
the one hand, and the elimination of the consequences of crisis phe-
nomena that spread in the Ukrainian banking sector in 2008–2009 
and 2013–2015, on the other, encourage the National Bank of Ukraine 
(NBU) to revise the approaches to risk management in the banking 
system towards the introduction of Basel III standards, the final tran-
sition to which is scheduled in the EU for 2019 (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2017).
The increase in the proportion of non-performing loans against 
the background of catastrophic depreciation of the hryvnia make 
banks cut their staff, save on operating costs and commissions, 
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revise revenue structures, optimize deposit and loan portfolios and postpone their ambitious innova-
tion development projects till “better” times.
In this situation, it is relevant to study the dynamics of certain indicators of banking activity and cur-
rent trends in the banking sector of Ukraine in accordance with the implementation stages of Basel III 
recommendations.
The study provides for the use of primary information from the official sources of the NBU and data from the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision for assessing compliance with regulatory requirements as well as 
the results of research and analytical reviews of the banking system conducted by rating agencies of Ukraine.
As the hypothesis of the study, the assumption is made that in order to stabilize the financial state of the 
banking system of Ukraine, the task of clearing the banking system from the ballast of “non-transpar-
ent”, “already dead” and “weak” banks becomes the top priority. This measure does not contribute to 
the development of confidence in the banking system and impedes the process of introducing innova-
tive products and technologies into the domestic banking market. But, nevertheless, it allows stabiliz-
ing the financial position through high-quality risk management in the banking sector which, in turn, 
should strengthen the stability of the country’s financial system as a whole.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The issues of managing the financial stability of 
the banking system, particularly related to regu-
latory framework placed by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision have been the subject of 
research by many foreign and domestic scientists.
Scientific contributions by scientists such as 
Weigand, Angelini, Clerc, Cúrdia, Gambacorta, 
Gerali, Locarno, Motto, Roeger, Van den Heuvel 
and Vlček are very important for the introduction 
of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
recommendations, Basel II and Basel III, into the 
banking systems of individual countries.
Weigand researched efficiency, growth, combina-
tion of assets, risk, operational efficiency, profit-
ability and capital reserves of the 20 largest banks 
in Japan, the United States and Europe for 2003–
2015 and made a conclusion that all banks hold 
more capital of the first level, than it is provided 
by the Basel III agreement, which led to a deep 
decrease in their net profit and return on equity. 
According to Weigand (2016, p. 75), “U.S. banks 
continue to exhibit a more robust post-crisis re-
covery, while Japanese and European banks con-
tinue to experience crisis-level conditions”.
Angelini et al. (2015, p. 217) studied long-term 
impact of Basel III Capital and Liquidity require-
ments and proved that economic costs of the new 
regulatory standards for bank capital and liquid-
ity are considerably below existing estimates of 
the benefits that the reform should have by reduc-
ing the probability of banking crises. According 
to these authors, “The reform dampens output 
volatility modestly, although there is some hetero-
geneity across models. The adoption of countercy-
clical capital buffers can substantially amplify the 
dampening effect on output volatility”.
Adesina and Mwamba determined possible im-
pact of the Basel III higher tier 1 capital require-
ments on bank lending rates in four African coun-
tries: Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. 
According to the authors (Adesina & Mwamba, 
2015, p. 61), “the implementation of the Basel III 
higher equity capital requirements is likely to have 
smaller effect on lending rates in South Africa and 
Nigeria, compared to Egypt and Kenya”. 
The studies by Kinyariro et al. (2016) are represen-
tative of this approach: that capital requirements, 
leverage requirements and liquidity requirements 
have a positive relationship with financial distress 
status of commercial banks in Kenya. The adoption 
of Basel III influences the financial distress status of 
commercial banks in Kenya (Kinyariro et al., 2016).
Also important for the introduction of the Basel 
Committee on Basel III recommendations into the 
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banking systems of individual countries are the 
scientific contributions of scientists from Qatar, 
Greece, UAE, South Africa, UK, Egypt, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, which reseached best practices and 
financial instruments that are responsible for 
suporting the financial stability in crises.
Anouze researched the performance of commercial 
banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) counG-
tries especially before, during, and after financial 
or political crises and made a conclusion that the 
banking system within GCC countries comprises 
two different operating banking systems, Islamic 
and conventional. The overall results show 
that conventional banks perform well during a 
political crisis, whereas Islamic banks performed 
better during the financial crisis. According 
to Anouze (2015. p. 111), “large and small size 
GCC commercial banks are more efficient than 
medium-sized banks”.
The studies by Garefalakis et al. are representa-
tive of approach in search for the effect of core 
characteristics of corporate governance on banks’ 
performance during the financial crisis. The re-
sults of their research of 86 worldwide banks sug-
gest that boards’ independence strongly supports 
banks’ efficiency and operations, as well as exter-
nal audit contributes positively to banks’ efficien-
cy during the crisis period. According to authors 
(Garefalakis et al., 2017, p. 69), “smaller boards are 
more efficient and tend to become a win-win strat-
egy for banks’ management during the years of 
economic crisis”.
Further improvements in the stability of bank-
ing system, for instance, bank credit risk estimate 
and improving the decision making process of 
Jordanian banks, are discussed by Al-Shawabkeh 
and Kanungo (2017). For example, the similar is-
sue is the focus of the international research by 
Migiro (2017), who explores the issues of opti-
mizing bank’s credit portfolio and credit rating 
as ways of improving the bank performance and 
finansial stabilization of bank system.
Kodasheva et al. (2017) studied the influence of ex-
ternal and internal factors that impede the devel-
opment of banking. In particular, the analysis of 
the banking sector in Kazakhstan showed that the 
banking sector of Kazakhstan is concentrated in 
five strategic banks, including subsidiaries of the 
Russian “Sberbank”, which accounts for 50% of 
shares in the financial market. The short-term and 
high-risk consumer loans, which can lead to high 
credit risks, in case of deterioration of econom-
ic situation and high bank dependence on state 
money are main problems of the banking sector 
of Kazakhstan. 
Authors admit that improving banking sector ac-
tivities can become a painful process for many 
participants, because this will require the “reset” 
of the financial sector in Kazakhstan and addi-
tional investment from shareholders or consoli-
dation with other players. According to authors 
(Kodasheva et al., 2017, p. 259), banking system of 
Kazakhstan is ““self-organizing”, since a change 
in the economic environment and the political sit-
uation will inevitably lead to “automatic” change 
in the bank’s policy”.
Ukrainian scientists have made a great scientific 
contribution into the research of stability of do-
mestic and global banking system. For exam-
ple, Stukalo et al. (2015) explored the problems 
of overall efficiency of the major banks in the 
global financial instability. In particular, authors 
analyzed main tendencies of functioning world 
economy in the conditions of global financial cri-
sis in 2008–2010. This gave the possibility to find 
the tendencies of bank development taking into 
account global financial instability influence and 
discribe negative and positive consequences of in-
fluence of global financial crisis. According to au-
thors (Stukalo et al., 2015, p. 60), “Globalization 
significantly affects the level of financial systems 
stability in developing countries. The negative ef-
fects of globalization are manifested in the emer-
gence of global financial crises and bank crises in 
particular”.
For example, Kuznetsova concluded that further 
consolidation of bank capital in Ukraine is pos-
sible with the active participation of the goverment. 
So, NBU will initiate the conclusion of mergers 
and acquisitions, in particular by raising the mini-
mum regulatory capital of the bank. According to 
Kuznetsova (2014, p. 8), “In the banks of Ukraine 
until 2018, it is planned to complete the introduction 
of Basel III. Such actions will undoubtedly lead to a 
reduction in the number of banks”. In addition, in 
166
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 12, Issue 4, 2017
2020, the banking system of Ukraine plans to im-
plement revolutionary structural changes, which 
will also deal with issues of consolidated processes 
involving banks (Kuznetsova, 2014).
Dmitrishin and Blahun allocated three basic strate-
gies for the banking sector management, based on 
the developed cognitive model, the current and fore-
cast changes of internal and external factors, which 
are determined in accordance with the stated goals 
of the Ukrainian banking system development. 
Authors (Dmitrishin & Blahun, 2014, p. 244), found 
the following: “The configuration of the banking 
system is considered as optimal in terms of the de-
velopment of competition between banks and from 
the standpoint of ensuring resilience to influences”.
Chmutova (2015) examined actual problems of the 
commercial bank financial priorities at the life cycle 
stages. She holds that a necessary condition for re-
storing the Ukrainian banking system is to develop 
an effective strategy based on the ensuring bank’s 
financial soundness. According to Chmutova (2015, 
p. 27), “The level of taxonometric indices of the com-
ponents of the bank’s financial soundness related to 
their life cycle stages. It established financial priori-
ties at each stage of the bank’s life cycle”.
Thus, the literature review shows the relevance 
of the chosen topic and a certain scientific 
uncertainty in the issues of Ukraine’s integration 
into the European banking system under financial 
instability.
The objective of this article is to analyze the de-
gree of compliance with the Basel III regulations 
in Ukraine and study the relationship between 
the stabilization process of the Ukranian banking 
sector and the program for the implementation of 
Basel III banking regulatory recommendations.
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The global financial crisis of the banking sys-
tem of 2007–2009 revealed some shortcomings 
in regulatory requirements for liquidity of banks 
in America and the European Union and led to 
the introduction in December 2010 by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision of updat-
ed guidance in the field of banking regulation 
Basel III, the final transition to which is sched-
uled for 2012–2019 (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2017). The main stages of the Basel III 
Accord implementation by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision are given in Table 1. 
The development of directives and recommenda-
tions is carried out in collaboration with the cen-
tral banks of participating countries and regula-
tory authorities around the world, and, therefore, 
they are used not only in the member states of the 
Basel Committee, but also in other countries. For 
example, the work on the implementation of Basel 
II recommendations was conducted in more than 
100 countries of the world. In the European Union 
the recommendations of the Basel Committee are 
used for the mutual integration of banking sys-
tems of the EU member states, with Ukraine also 
joining this process. The main stages of imple-
mentation of Basel III requirements for capital in 
Ukraine are given in Table 2.
The implementation of Basel III recommendations 
by the National Bank of Ukraine was started only 
in 2015, and accordingly, the completion of this pro-
cess in Ukraine is planned before 2020, i. e., a year 
later than it will take place in the Basel Committee 
member states.
The development of all regulatory and legal acts 
in relation to Basel III Accord should be complet-
ed in the current year. Thus, to test and introduce 
new capital requirements the next three years are 
assigned which will lead to the activation of cap-
ital buffers and the introduction of new require-
ments for leverage indicators in 2020. 
Adoption of regulations on capital buffers in ac-
cordance with Basel III in 2015 was reflected in 
the Resolution of the Board of the National Bank 
of Ukraine dated October 20, 2015, No 715 “On 
Amendments to the Regulation on the Procedure 
for the Establishment and Use of Reserves by 
Ukrainian Banks for Reimbursement of Possible 
Losses through Active Banking Operations” and 
the Resolution of the Board of the National Bank 
of Ukraine dated November 26, 2015, No 830 “On 
Amendments to the Regulation on the Procedure 
for the Formation and Use by Ukrainian banks of 
Reserves to Cover Possible Losses through Active 
Banking Operations”.
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In its turn, the requirements for the implementa-
tion of the NBU regulations and stress testing have 
revealed the failure of many banks in Ukraine to 
comply with the provisions for reserving funds for 
possible losses through active banking operations, 
as evidenced by statistical data. For example, “33 
banks went bankrupt in 2014, the same number – 
in 2015, 21 – in 2016” (National Bank of Ukraine, 
2016), and only two – PSC “Platinum Bank” and 
PJSC “Bank Boguslav” (National Bank of Ukraine, 
2017) – in 2017.
It should be added that the decision of the NBU 
on withdrawal of the banking license and liquida-
tion of JSC “Bank CHBDR”, PJSC “MORSKOY” and 
PJSC “EASTERN INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL 
BANK” in 2015 was adopted without the preliminary 
Table 1. The main stages of Basel III implementation (2013–2019)  
Source: based on information from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013, 2017).
Stages 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Capital
Leverage ratio
Parallel implementation: January 1, 2013 – 
January 1, 2017. The dissemination will start 
on January 1, 2015
Migration to 
pillar 1
Common equity capital ratio 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
Capital buffer – – – 0.625% 1.25% 1. 875% 2.5%
Common equity ratio + capital 
buffer 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0%
Percentage of deductions 
applicable to common equity 
(including tax assets, holdings 
in financial institutions, rights 
to mortgage debt service)
– 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100%
Tier 1 ratio 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0%
Total capital ratio – 8.0% 8.0%
Total capital ratio + capital 
buffer – 8.0% 8.0% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5%
Capital elements not suitable 
for tier 1 and tier 2 – To be gradually withdrawn within 10 years since 2013
Liquidity
Liquidity coverage ratio – – 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Net stable funding ratio – – – – –
Minimum 
standard is 
implemented
–
Table 2. The main stages of implementation of new requirements for capital in Ukraine (2015–2020) 
Source: based on information from the National Bank of Ukraine (2017).
No. Indicators Measures 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
1 Capital buffer
Adoption of regulatory  
and legal acts х – – – – –
Buffer activation – – – – – х
2 New structure of capital 
Development of regulatory 
and legal acts – х х – – –
Test calculations – – х х – –
Introduction of new 
requirements – – – – х –
3 Requirements for capital to cover operational and market risks 
Development of regulatory 
and legal acts – – х х – –
Test calculations – – – х х –
Introduction of new 
requirements – – – – х –
4  Indicator of leverage
Development of regulatory 
and legal acts – – х х – –
Test calculations – – – х х –
Introduction of new 
requirements – – – – – х
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introduction of the interim administration. In 
this case, the reason for such a decision was the 
impossibility for the NBU to exercise due super-
vision and control as a result of hostilities in the 
East of Ukraine and the illegal annexation of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea.
However, the Resolution of the Board of the National 
Bank of Ukraine dated June 30, 2016, No 351 “On 
Approval of the Regulation on Determining the 
Size of Credit Risk by Banks of Ukraine for Active 
Banking Transactions” became the main regulato-
ry and legal act of the banking system of Ukraine, 
which abolished the eight previous resolutions of 
the NBU Board and provided the banking system of 
the country with clear principles and standards for 
assessing credit risks and borrowers.
The principles laid down in Resolution No 351 
gave a clear understanding of the recognition of 
credit risk based on the actual solvency of the 
borrowers and their ability to comply with the 
terms of the agreement, transparency of bank-
ing activities, not only for the NBU, but also 
for the banks themselves. Thus, since June 2016, 
the Board of the National Bank of Ukraine de-
cided to consent to the self-liquidation of PJSC 
“FINANCE BANK”, PJSC “Investment-Trust 
Bank” and JSC FINEXBANK. According to offi-
cial reports, such decisions were dictated by the 
desire of these banks’ owners to reorient them to 
other types of their core business (National Bank 
of Ukraine, 2016).
Since the beginning of 2016, the number of func-
tioning banking institutions has decreased by 21. 
Reasons for withdrawal of the banking license and 
the liquidation of these banks were different. For ex-
ample, the NBU decided to revoke a banking license 
and liquidate several banking institutions as a result 
of violations of banking legislation in the field of fi-
nancial monitoring. Among them were banks, such 
as: PJSC “Bank VELES”, PJSC “CB PREMIUM”, 
PJSC CB “Soyuz” and PJSC “KSG BANK”.
Also in 2016, the NBU withdrew PJSC “BANK 
UNISON”, JSC CB “TK CREDIT” and PSC 
“SMARTBANK” from the market “due to the dis-
crepancy of their ownership structure with the re-
quirements for their transparency”.
In addition to violating the legislation on prevent-
ing and counteracting the legalization (launder-
ing) of proceeds from crime, one of the instru-
ments for recognition of the banks’ insolvency 
and the withdrawal of their banking licenses by 
the NBU was the inadequate level of their capital-
ization and the inability of owners (shareholders) 
to provide the bank with an appropriate level of 
financial support.
Thus, as of October 1, 2017, only 88 banking in-
stitutions have had the licenses of the National 
Bank of Ukraine including 38 banks with foreign 
capital. Detailed information on the dynamics 
of changes in the number of banks in Ukraine is 
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Dynamics of changes in the number of banks in Ukraine (2016–2017), pcs 
Source: based on information from the National Bank of Ukraine (2017).
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In total, for the period of the year bank licenses 
were withdrawn by the NBU from 21 banks, in-
cluding tree banks with a share of foreign capital. 
The relative stability in the number of banks with 
foreign capital in the period from 2016 to 2017 and 
the constant number of banks with 100% foreign 
capital indicate that the management of foreign 
banks have already used the method for calculat-
ing the credit risk of borrowers in accordance with 
Basel III or other similar requirements, based on 
the assessment of the actual solvency of borrowers 
and their ability to comply with the terms of the 
contract.
Implementation of Basel III recommendations 
by regulating the size of credit risk through ac-
tive banking operations in accordance with the 
Resolution of the Board of the National Bank of 
Ukraine No 351 contributed to reducing the ex-
ternal debt of banks as well as the number of loss-
making banks in Ukraine.
In recent years, the gross external debt of banks 
in foreign currency has a tendency to decrease 
annually. The dynamics of gross external debt of 
banks in foreign currency in 2014–2017 is shown 
in Figure 2.
The reduction of the gross external debt of banks 
has a correlation with the total number of unprof-
itable banks in the period from 2014 to 2017. The 
dynamics of the number of unprofitable banks is 
shown in Figure 3.
So, since 2015, when the National Bank of Ukraine 
began implementing the Basel III recommenda-
tions, the number of unprofitable banks, banks 
with negative operating income and negative net 
interest income is constantly decreasing.
According to the results of 2016, the list of three 
most harmful Ukrainian banks included PJSC 
“UKRSOCBANK”, which was in process of merging 
Figure 2. Gross external debt of banks, USD bln
Source: based on information from the National Bank of Ukraine (2017).
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with the group of PJSC “Alfa-Bank”, PJSC “VTB 
BANK” as well as PJSC CB “PRIVATBANK”, which 
was nationalized at the end of the year. At the same 
time, among the most lucrative banks for the same 
period were only foreign financial institutions – JSC 
Raiffeisen Bank Aval, PJSC “CITYBANK” and JSC 
“OTP BANK”. So the top-3 most profitable banks 
by the end of 2016 accounted for 57.5% of the total 
profits received last year by the banking system of 
Ukraine (National Bank of Ukraine, 2016).  
Thus, it confirms once again that the application of 
Basel III recommendations by the banking system 
of Ukraine, which have been successfully applied 
by foreign banks in their activities, will allow not 
only to reduce the number of unprofitable banks 
but also to make them profitable. But it should be 
stressed that not all Ukrainian banks will be able 
to pass testing and adaptation.
It should also be noted that, in the current situ-
ation, foreign banks with their effective system 
of managing credit risks consistently occupy the 
largest share of net loans – 44%, while state banks, 
even taking into account the nationalization of 
PJSC CB “PRIVATBANK”, cover only 38% of the 
Ukrainian credit market. Net loans by groups of 
Ukrainian banks are shown in Figure 4.
The analysis of deposits of the population by groups 
of banks has also shown relative stability of the 
share of foreign banks. Deposits of the population 
by groups of Ukrainian banks are shown in Figure 5.
In the period from 2013 to 2017, the private banks 
lost the largest share of the market, which was 
taken over by state-owned banks, including the 
nationalized Privatbank. Foreign banks have not 
been interested in attracting deposits from the 
population, as evidenced by low interest rates on 
deposits in national and foreign currencies. 
Consequently, since 2013, the banking sector of 
Ukraine has undergone some changes: as a re-
sult of the transformation of the privately-owned 
Privatbank into the state-owned bank, the bank-
ruptcy of several dozens of private banks, the 
structure of the banking system of the state has 
changed significantly, while the system as a whole 
has coped well with this transformation in terms 
of improving financial stability.
The empirical data show that foreign banks have 
been more financially stable than private and state 
banks. Moreover, their stability has been observed 
throughout the analyzed period.
It should be noted that the desire of foreign 
banks to lend to the Ukrainian economy and the 
Ukrainian population significantly affects the li-
quidity of the entire banking system of the coun-
try. The analysis of banking programs for auto lend-
ing to individuals in foreign banks showed that the 
fulfillment of their requirements for the formation 
and use of reserves for the reimbursement of pos-
sible losses through active banking operations is 
carried out at the expense of initial contributions 
Figure 4. Net loans by groups of Ukrainian banks, %
Source: based on information from the National Bank of Ukraine (2017).
12% 15% 19% 25%
29%18%
19% 25% 10%
9%
28% 32%
38% 45% 44%
42% 35%
19% 20% 18%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
State Privatbank Privatbank nationalized Foreign Private
171
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 12, Issue 4, 2017
Source: based on information from the National Bank of Ukraine (2017).
Figure 5. Net deposits of the population by groups of banks, %
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Table 3. Loans for a new car of foreign production (dated November 2017)
Source: formed by authors (Ukrainian Bank Portal, 2017).
Type  
of bank Name
Name  
of the auto 
credit program
Sum of credit, 
UAH ths
Initial 
payment from 
sum of credit, 
%
Credit period,
months Loan rate, %
min max min max min max min max
Foreign
UkrSibBank New auto 150 800 15 40 12 84 11 17
Credobank Credoauto 150 1000 10 50 12 84 14.49 20.99
Credit Agricole 
Bank
“Partnership” 
program 200 1000 10 60 12 84 0.01 15.99
OTP Bank Optimal choice 200 1000 20 60 12 72 0.01 17.49
State
Ukrgazbank  “Standard” auto credit 10 700 10 50 12 84 6.49 14.99
Privatbank Auto credit from Privatbank 2 800 10 99.9 12 60 – 28
Oschadbank Credit program No.1 0 3000 10 99.9 12 84 0.01 16.99
Ukreximbank Means of transport 50 1000 15 12 60 17.5 –
Private
TAScombank “Go for your dream” 150 1000 20 60 12 84 0.01 17.6
Idea bank Cash loan to buy a car 1 200 0 99.9 6 60 15 21.99
Globus Bank Auto in credit 10 2000 10 50 12 84 14 19
Pivdennyi “Your new auto” 1 80% of price 20 50 12 84 16.9 19.9
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of borrowers. The main banks – players in the 
Ukrainian car loan market are grouped into 
Table 3. 
Comparisons of the conditions of auto lend-
ing by groups of banks have shown that foreign 
banks within the group have roughly the same 
amount terms of loans and the percentage of ini-
tial contribution from the sum of a car loan. In 
addition, the lowest loan rates are offered by 50% 
of investigated foreign banks, while public and 
private banks have a 25% share in their group. 
In addition, it is difficult to identify a certain 
grouping in the terms of auto lending by state 
and private banks because they radically differ 
from each other.
CONCLUSION
Consequently, the introduction by the banking system of Ukraine of anti-crisis measures in response 
to shortcomings in financial regulation along with the implementation of Basel III methodological re-
commendations in the field of banking regulation helped not only to identify and remove a “malignant 
tumor” on the “body” of the banking system, but also to enable it to survive and start a new phase in 
the EU banking environment.
Prospects for further research
The banking system is a pivotal element of the economy of any country. Today, many scholars and ex-
perts in banking regulation consider  Basel II and Basel III recommendations of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision as an effective tool for integrating the banking systems of the EU member 
states. At the same time, the implementation of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision recom-
mendations in the banking system of Ukraine revealed certain individual features in the process of 
implementing Basel common standards.
Cleaning the banking system as a prerequisite for change
In this case, it is about the firm decision of the regulator to withdraw from the financial market of 
Ukraine profitable banks with an “opaque ownership structure”, banks – violators of legislation in the 
field of financial monitoring and banks outside its influence located on the territory of combat opera-
tions in the East of Ukraine and the illegally annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Cleaning the 
banking system is a key as it will strengthen Ukrainian banks and, therefore, financial stability.
Optimization of the banking system as an effective tool for anti-crisis 
management
In the context of the falling national currency and military operations on the territory of the country, some 
Ukrainian banks conducted an ineffective policy of creating reserves to compensate for potential losses 
through active banking operations. All this contributed to the withdrawal of insolvent banking institutions 
from the banking market due to their inadequate capitalization and the inability of owners (shareholders) 
to provide the banks with an adequate level of financial support. The same applied to the banks that were 
incapable of complying with reserve provisions for potential losses through active banking operations, and 
the banks that at will of their owners decided to reorient themselves to other types of financial activities.
Banks with foreign capital are the most stable in the banking system of Ukraine 
Their largest share in the market of loans is 44%, a significant share in the deposit market – 35%, and the 
number of banks is stable – only two of them with foreign capital were not licensed by the NBU in 2016, 
while banks with 100% foreign capital have all remained in the market.
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Thus, the implementation of Basel III recommendations in the banking system of Ukraine has broad 
prospects and needs for constant attention from the banking sector including all state, private and for-
eign banks in order to consolidate the stability of the financial system of the country as a whole.
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